Source: Institute of defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University

Globalisation is founded on free trade, and shipping lanes are arteries through which these exchanges of goods flow. At a time when people around the world are increasingly aware of the need to protect the environment, securing energy supplies has become a major, indeed a vital strategic concern. Certain sensitive zones can be identified in the light of these factors, which include maritime straits that act as pinch points on trade flows.
If our citizens feel themselves to be directly concerned by maritime security around our coasts — in the English Channel, the Bay of Biscay and the western Mediterranean — the security of the straits of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb or Gibraltar is just as vital to Europe’s economic wellbeing. Equally, the straits of Malacca and Singapore in the Far East are of great importance to our economies and although they are little-known by the general public, they are keenly observed by business.
The Strait of Malacca(1) is one of the world’s busiest and narrowest shipping lanes. It is here that trade routes across the Pacific and Indian oceans meet, and through it pass ships carrying Asian imports of hydrocarbons and exports of manufactured goods. It is difficult to make an accurate assessment of traffic volumes through the Strait of Malacca(2). It is estimated that close to 30% of manufactured goods and 50% of global energy needs transit this zone. Measuring 600 nautical miles in length from its 200-mile-wide northern entrance off the coast of Sumatra, the Strait of Malacca narrows considerably, measuring eight miles across off the south of the Malaysian peninsula and just three miles across to the south of Singapore at the point where it opens up onto the China Sea. At around 25 metres deep, its shallow waters limit traffic to vessels below 300,000 tonnes. Other maritime passages exist in the region, the Sunda Strait, which is more awkward to navigate, as well as the Lombok and Makassar straits within the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos. Ultimately, it is always possible to take a route around the south of Australia.
The Strait of Malacca numbers many ports and oil terminals along its length, particularly in northern Sumatra where the absence of infrastructure means that heavy goods and petroleum products cannot be sent by road. This accounts for the fact that almost 55% of the strait’s total maritime traffic is inshore traffic, mostly of small tonnage. 
The region has a long maritime tradition, as it lies upon the ancient Silk Road route. The sea-going arm of the Silk Road linked China to Madagascar and the Persian Gulf before continuing by land to Constantinople and Venice. In his book The Travels of Marco Polo, Marco Polo described life in the Strait of Malacca in the late 13th century. Faced with an enforced five-month wait in Sumatra for favourable winds, he was forced to protect himself against the hospitality of the Malays whom he described as “bestial men who eat people”. The Chinese junks that passed via Malacca weighed around 3,000 tonnes and carried cargoes of silk, spices, tea, Chinese porcelain, pearls from the Persian Gulf and handicrafts and gems from India. In the early 15th century, it was through the Straits of Malacca that the renowned Chinese eunuch admiral Zheng He (known also as Three Jewels) led his fleet of over 300 junks on voyages to Hormuz and Aden.
The density of maritime traffic in this zone in modern times brings with it a degree of risk. With the ever-present danger of collisions, environmental risks may seem to be the most threatening. Yet despite the density of traffic, the 1992 collision between the supertanker Nagasaki Spirit and the containership Ocean Blessing, which led to a fire and the loss of both crews, is, with almost 12,000 tonnes of crude oil spilt at sea, the only incident to have caused notable environmental damage. In shipping circles, the Strait of Malacca is known primarily for piracy which persists into the 21st century. Pirate attacks peaked in 2000 when over 100 cases were reported. Attacks occur for the most part close to shore (around the port of Belawan, Sumatra, in the southern section of the Strait of Malacca and east of Bintan island at the eastern entrance to the Strait of Singapore), with many vessels being attacked at anchor as they await permission to enter port. It is predominantly smaller inshore vessels that are attacked, with the pirates seeking either cash carried onboard or, more unusually, the cargo itself. In 2005, only two large vessels transiting the Strait were attacked out of a total of about forty separate acts recorded that year. Kidnappings and hijackings for ransom remain isolated events (31 cases between 2000 and 2005, only five of these concerning vessels of over 1,000 tonnes). These figures should however be treated with caution as many local ship owners prefer to keep silent, negotiating directly with gangs in order to continue operating their business in the region.
Piracy, alongside fishing, is ingrained in the Malay tradition. There are underlying factors behind this, such as the 1997 Asian economic meltdown that increased poverty levels, the growth in maritime traffic in recent years, and navigating conditions in the Strait itself, which make it harder for vessels to manoeuvre. Most crew members come from emerging nations and are contracted for long periods of time; their wages are paid onboard in cash, which represents a tempting haul to would-be pirates.
A consensus appears to be emerging amongst the three countries bordering the Strait. This aims to prevent other powers encroaching on their zone of influence by ensuring that a clear distinction is made between ‘piracy’ and ‘terrorism’, whilst at the same time taking steps to stamp out piracy. Statements made in 2006 by regional terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah and by al-Qaeda’s second in command to the effect that the Philippines and Indonesia were “Islam’s new borders” have not led to any perceptible rise in the threat levels to maritime trade flows. Quite the opposite. Determined joint efforts undertaken from 2005 by Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have led to a real fall in acts of piracy. In 2006, international shipping insurance companies downgraded the Strait of Malacca from its previous status as a war zone, a decision that is estimated to have saved international shipping companies approximately $50 million in insurance premiums. There is a direct link between the anti-piracy enforcement action and the prevention of terrorist acts at sea.
Cooperation between the three neighbouring coastal states to improve security in the Strait started during the 1990s, in a process driven by ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), but it only became genuinely operational as of 2004. At the time, Malaysia and Indonesia were extremely reticent in the face of mutterings from Japan and the USA about sending naval vessels to the area to beef up security along shipping routes. Malaysia and Indonesia have painful memories of occupation by the Japanese and remain deeply influenced by the characters of their former leaders Mahatir Mohamed and President Sukarno, both of whom attempted to forge national identities whilst preaching non-alignment. Furthermore, such a move would certainly have goaded China, which is the major regional power and enjoys strong ties with Singapore. In December 2006 China, whose territorial claims in the South China Sea include areas also claimed by Malaysia, stated through its president Hu Jintao that it was determined to become a naval power. As part of its so-called string of pearls policy — designed to secure energy supplies along a line stretching from Shanghai to the Strait of Hormuz — China cannot tolerate a situation where the security of its energy supplies would depend on nations other than those along the route. China therefore pays close attention to its ties with the countries of South-East Asia through the agency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, developing a concept of naval security based on mutual trust with the local powers.
The beginning of the 21st century is witness to widespread naval rearmament in the region. Singapore is building an effective navy complete with a fleet of patrol boats, six submarines and six stealth frigates. Malaysia is purchasing a fleet of submarines and landing ships, and is refitting its frigates. Indonesia, for its part, is also modernising its navy although the nature of its archipelago means that its forces are far more dispersed. Albeit at different speeds, all three states bordering the Strait of Malacca have nonetheless modernised their naval and coastguard forces, as well as strengthening their operating bases along the banks of the Strait.
Concerning security in the Strait, Singapore is clear in its desire to control its approaches as tightly as possible. It is therefore seeking to cooperate with other nations further afield, notably for the purpose of exchanging information about maritime traffic. Malaysia and Indonesia on the other hand seem keen to focus more specifically on trilateral cooperation based on coordinated patrols, aerial surveillance of the seas and the adoption of standardised procedures. Radar coverage, backed by AIS (Automatic Identification System) and LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking) data, is now in place. A centre for cooperation and sharing maritime data with regional partners is scheduled to open in Singapore in 2009 at the new Changi command and control centre. Able to pinpoint and address potential seaborne threats at an early stage, the regional centre fits perfectly into Singapore’s no-compromise security policy. Singapore’s economic stability is particularly vulnerable to terrorist attack and it depends heavily on the safety of the Strait of Malacca. An illustration of this dependency is the approximately 20 million containers handled annually by the Singapore hub. France’s Institute for Navigation reports that the three coastal states, emboldened by the progress made in improving maritime security in the zone, are studying the possibility of charging shipping companies and other users for the protection provided. This type of levy would undoubtedly raise a number of issues surrounding its compatibility with the principle of free movement through the straits.
Aside from purely economic interests centring on the export of naval and military equipment, France possesses a number of other interests in the zone, and has its own role to play. France offers an alternative to the “Anglo-Saxon” presence comprising the Americans as well as Australians and British. In strategic terms, Singapore offers a base able to accept nuclear-powered warships in a region notable for the competing presence of the world’s number two and three economic powers, China and Japan, at a time when there is no certainty that the current status quo in the South and East China Seas will continue indefinitely. Aside from the oil fields in the area that Total has invested in over the past several decades, French companies control extensive economic assets, especially maritime, in the region. For instance, CMA/CGM, the world’s number three shipping company, has opened regular connections between China and Africa; in 2006, one of its container ships docked in China every seven hours.
Our involvement in maritime security through the promotion of more wide-ranging information sharing, our skills developed in monitoring the Straits of Dover and our permanent presence in the Indian and Pacific oceans have all played a part in the development of vibrant partnerships with Malaysia and Singapore; partnerships that will grow in the future. In addition to a shared concern with maritime security comes our expertise in anti-mine operations and our shared experience in the fight against drug smuggling, combatting maritime terrorism, etc. The part played by France and its navy in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami provided a trigger for re-starting dialogue with Indonesia, a vital regional partner that is also active in the resolution of other crises, for example in Lebanon.
In conclusion, with the advent of globalisation, the importance of maritime security in South-East Asia is far more wide-ranging than a simple regional security issue, for it directly impacts our own economic well-being. In the future there are two physical factors that may affect the importance of the Strait of Malacca:
• a canal cut through the Kra Isthmus between Thailand and Burma (a distance of 45 kilometres across 75-metre high hills);
• with the melting of the polar ice, the North-West Passage in the Artic Ocean. This would open a new shipping route to Europe for Japanese and Chinese exports, although it would have no impact on maritime energy supply routes.
In my naval and military capacity, it seems to me that the strategic importance of the Strait of Malacca lies principally in the financial clout of Singapore and its port hub. Sea routes between the Indian Ocean and the China Sea via the Strait of Lombok do not represent any detour that might be significant to the Chinese, Japanese and South Koreans; indeed, such routes would be navigable by larger vessels. However, these routes would require navigating the waters of the Indonesian archipelago, which are more difficult to survey and for whose security a single country is responsible. In 2007, these routes were more vulnerable than was the route via the Strait of Malacca, where the level of security has been markedly improved thanks to regional cooperation by the coastal states.
Jacques Attali, in A Short History of the Future, highlighted the threat of wars driven by scarcities, stressing the fact that “every maritime zone beneath which lie the main oil deposits of the future, and every zone through which tanker convoys sail, represent so many possible areas of conflict.” The Strait of Malacca, with the oil deposits in the South China Sea and its maritime traffic, is very vulnerable in this regard. Let us hope that the measures undertaken over the past few years in this zone to tackle pirates, whose “role down the ages has always been to sever ties between settled populations,” will continue to make an impact as well as helping to ensure that the Strait is not paralysed by a terrorist strike. Every improvement made to maritime security directly aids economic prosperity in Asia and Europe alike, thanks the commercial and financial interdependency of our economies. It is for this reason that we must support the efforts undertaken to reinforce maritime security in the Strait of Malacca, which is today’s oceanic point of entry to the markets of Asia.

1- Distinction should properly be made between the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Singapore. For the purposes of this article they shall both be referred to as the Strait of Malacca.
2- In 1999, the Japan Maritime Research Institute observed 75,510 vessels of over 1,000 tonnes. According to the July 2007 issue of Navigation, estimated traffic in 2020 will be 4 billion tonnes.